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REACTIONS TO EMPIRICAL
STUDIES'
BY

MICHAEL ADLER*

I. INTRODUCTION
One particularly attractive feature of being asked to comment on
the empirical studies by Saul Schwartz and Leigh Anderson,1 and by lain
Ramsay, 2 as a member of a panel, is that I do not have to give a
comprehensive assessment of their research. My approach has been to
focus on those features of their research that I found particularly
interesting.
II. SOME KEY FINDINGS
As far as I was concerned, one of the most interesting findings in
the two reports was Ramsay's demonstration that there was remarkably
little use of formal debt enforcement procedures by creditors prior to
bankruptcy. 3 I had not been aware of Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren,
and Jay Westbrook's finding (in their 1989 study of filings under
Chapters 7 and 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code 4) that in twothirds of the cases they examined, no collection suit had been filed
against consumers before they declared bankruptcy.5 However, like
Ramsay, I had assumed that bankruptcy would be seen as the end of the
© 1999, M. Adler.
* Professor of Socio-Legal Studies, University of Edinburgh.

I See S. Schwartz & L. Anderson, An Empirical Study of Canadians Seeking Personal
Bankruptcy Protection (Ottawa: Industry Canada, 1998), online: Industry Canada <http://strategis.ic.
gc.ca/SSG/caOO889e.html> (date accessed: 11 June 1999). The findings of this study are
summarized in this Symposium: see S. Schwartz, "The Empirical Dimensions of Consumer
Bankruptcy: Results From a Survey of Canadian Bankrupts" (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 83.
2 See I.D.C. Ramsay, "Individual Bankruptcy: Preliminary Findings of a Socio-Legal Analysis"
(1999) 37 Osgoode Hall I.J. 15.
3 See Ramsay, supra note 2 at 66-67.
4 11 U.S.C., ch. 7, 13 (1998).
5 See T.A. Sullivan, E. Warren & J.L. Westbrook, As We Forgive Our Debtors: Bankruptcy and
ConsumerCreditinAmerica (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) at 305.
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debt collection process; individuals who have had collection action taken
against them eventually become overwhelmed and declare bankruptcy. 6
This view, I must admit, had been shaped by findings, such as Schwartz
and Anderson's, that "the economic situation of those seeking
bankruptcy was far worse than the economic situation of those seeking
credit counselling." 7
Ramsay's finding clearly calls for some explanation. It may well
be the case that, as some of the trustees reported to him, consumers
choose to make themselves bankrupt to escape harassment from
creditors and collection agencies, and their possible use of formal
remedies. However, it does not follow from this that, in other respects,
consumer debtors who file for bankruptcy are no different from those
who are subject to formal debt enforcement procedures. The empirical
evidence indicates that this is not the case.
In the United Kingdom, a large, benchmark national survey of
credit and debt carried out in 19898 confirmed what numerous
small-scale studies had already indicated, namely, that debt is associated
with low incomes and, particularly, with the presence of children in the
household. Those with debts were frequently either dependent on social
security or employed in the low-wage, secondary labour market. Most
were clearly unable to pay in the short-term, and probably in the midand long-term as well.
Faced with default, creditors typically first attempt to recover
debts administratively. If and when that fails, they may sell the debt to a
debt-collecting agency, or raise an action in court and take legal steps to
enforce the debt. However, when it becomes clear that the debtor is
insolvent aid unable to pay, most creditors will write off the debt.
Although some creditors go to considerable lengths to pressure debtors
into payment, and some people probably do seek to avoid this by going
bankrupt, it still came as a surprise to me that few of those who made
themselves bankrupt had been on the receiving end of legal debt
enforcement procedures.
A significant difference between the sample of bankrupts studied
by Ramsay and the general (Ontario) population is the proportion who
are self-employed. Ramsay reports that 28 per cent of his sample
described themselves as self-employed, and 24 per cent indicated that

6 See Ramsay, supra note 2 at 67.
7 Schwartz & Anderson, supra note 1 at 80.
8 See R. Berthoud & E. Kempson, Credit and Debt: The PSI Study (London: Policy Studies
Institute, 1992).
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they had been in business during the five years previous to their
bankruptcy. 9 Whether or not the two groups are mutually exclusive is
unclear but, as he points out, the percentage who are self-employed is
clearly higher (he might have said "much higher") than the percentage
of the Ontario workforce who are self-employed and, I would guess,
much higher also than the percentage of those subject to debt
enforcement procedures who are self-employed.
Schwartz and Anderson explore this phenomenon more
systematically, citing the growth of self-employment as one reason for
the increase in the number of personal bankruptcies. As they point out,
the number of workers classified as self-employed in Canada rose by
almost 1 million between 1977 (when the total was 1.3 million) and
1996.10 Moreover, roughly one in four of the bankrupts in their sample
(251 out of 1,018) was either self-employed at the time of their survey or
reported that they had been self-employed within the last five years, and
these self-employed bankrupts had much higher "debt-to-income ratios"
than other bankrupts. Although the percentage of bankrupts in the
sample who were self-employed is considerably higher than the
percentage of self-employed persons in the Canadian population, the
fact that the self-employed only accounted for about 25 per cent of the
sample of bankrupts suggests that the increase in self-employment is, at
best, a very partial explanation for the increase in the number of
personal bankruptcies. However, the increase in self-employment is, in
my view, almost certainly more important than the two other social
trends investigated by Schwartz and Anderson, namely, the number of
single women and the number of young people in the population.
Although some single women and young people go bankrupt, their
numbers are not especially important influences on the bankruptcy rate.
Schwartz and Anderson's first conclusion that those seeking
bankruptcy protection are neither a homogeneous group, nor a
representative sample of the population,11 is undoubtedly correct. Their
second conclusion, that no single aggregate measure of economic
performance (e.g., gross national product, unemployment rates, the
amount of outstanding consumer credit, and the ratio of personal debt
to personal disposable income) can explain the growth in the number of
personal bankruptcies1 2 is somewhat premature. Although they have
9 See Ramsay, supranote 2 at 37.
10 See Schwartz & Anderson, supra note 1 at 39; and Schwartz, supra note 1 at 108.
11 See Schwartz & Anderson, supra note 1 at 66.
12
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shown that none of the measures they examined can, on their own, be
used to predict the rate of personal bankruptcy, they have not
investigated, in statistical terms or by any other method, whether a
combination of measures can be used to predict the personal bankruptcy
rate. What is required, in addition to the bivariate analyses that Schwartz
and Anderson have carried out, is a multivariate analysis, not restricted
to the four variables they used, but (as Jay Westbrook suggested 3 )
including aggregate measures of debt, and employing a range of
statistical tests. That said, I do support their hunch that finer, less
general, explanations are almost certainly required. According to
Ramsay,
[a]n initial analysis might be attempted by adopting a broad-brush classification of
contemporary societies as consisting of four main classes: (1) a professional-business
class; (2) a class of small-scale independent business people; (3) a working class with
white- and blue-collar segments; and (4) an underclass. Using this classification, I would
conclude that individual bankrupts are drawn primarily from the working class and, to a
14
lesser degree, from the category of small-scale independent business people.

Maybe, but supposing we were to use a somewhat more sophisticated
classification of the occupational structure of contemporary societies,
what then? Both studies use the Pineo-Porter-McRoberts Occupational
Prestige Scale,15 but I would like to look at three more theoreticallybased approaches.
III. MEASURES OF SOCIAL CLASS
Robert Erikson and John Goldthorpe's study is arguably the best
known and, at least among European sociologists, the most widely used
classificatory scheme.1 6 Erikson and Goldthorpe start out from a basic,
three-fold division of class positions as follows: (1) employers: i.e., those
who buy the labour of others, and thus assume some degree of authority
and control over them; (2) self-employed workers without employees:
those who neither buy the labour of others, nor sell their own; and (3)
employees: those who sell their labour to others, and thus place
themselves to some degree under their authority and control.
13 See J.L. Westbrook, "Comparative Empiricism" (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 143 at 152-53.
14 Ramsay, supranote 2 at 41.
15 See P.C. Pineo, J. Porter & H.A. MbRoberts, "The 1971 Census and the Socioeconomic
Classification of Occupations" (1977) 14 Can. Rev. Soc. & Anth. 91.
16 See R. Erikson & J.H. Goldthorpe, The ConstantFlux A Study of Class Mobility in Industrial
Societies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).
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This is then modified to take account of two closely-related
developments within the twentieth-century industrial world: (a) the
transformation of property into corporate forms, which has resulted in
most major employers being organizations rather than individuals; and
(b) the growth of employees as a proportion of the total active
population, accompanied by greater differentiation of the forms of
employer-employee relations. This produces a detailed class schema
which is set out in Table 1, below-the class position of a family being
determined by reference to either the husband or the wife, whoever may
be regarded as dominant in the labour market. The connection between
the basic three-fold classification and this detailed schema is set out in
Figure 1.17
TABLE 1
THE CATEGORIES OF THE ERIKSON AND
GOLDTHORPE CLASS SCHEMA
I.
II.

IIIa.
IlIb.
IVa.
IVb.
IVc.
V.
VI.
VIIa.
VIIb.

17

Higher grade professionals, administrators and
managers; large proprietors
Professionals, administrators and managers; higher
grade technicians; supervisors of non-manual
employees
Routine non-manual employees; higher grade
Routine non-manual employees; lower grade
Small proprietors, artisans, etc., with employees
Small proprietors, artisans, etc., without employees
Farmers and smallholders; other self-employed
workers in primary production
Lower grade technicians; supervisors of manual
workers
Skilled manual workers
Semi- and unskilled manual workers (not in
agriculture, etc.)
Agricultural and other workers in primary
production

See Appendix, below.
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Erik Wright adopts a somewhat different approach in his recent
study.18 He first distinguishes owners from employees in terms of their
relations to the means of production. He then distinguishes owners, in
terms of the number of people they employ, and employees, in terms
both of their relations to authority and their relations to scarce skills.
This generates a twelve-fold classification of individuals which is set out
in Table 2, below-men and women being classified separately. The
relations between the classes are set out in Figure 2.19
TABLE 2
THE CATEGORIES OF THE WRIGHT
CLASS DISTRIBUTION
1.
2.
3.

Capitalists
Small employers
Petty bourgeoisie

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Expert managers
Skilled managers
Nonskilled managers
Expert supervisors
Skilled supervisors
Nonskilled supervisors

10.
11.
12.

Experts
Skilled workers
Nonskilled workers

By contrast, Will Hutton, instead of basing a system of
classification on relations to the means of production, identifies groups
in terms of risk and insecurity2 0 He argues that there are three main
groups in Britain: the bottom 30 per cent of unemployed and
economically inactive persons are marginalized; the middle 30 per cent
are in employment, but in structurally insecure jobs; while only the top
40 per cent are in tenured jobs with reasonably secure job prospects. The
resulting "30/30/40 society" is a proxy for the growth of insecurity that is

now all-pervasive.

18 See E.O. Wright, Class Counts: Comparative Studies in Class Analysis (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997).
19 See Appendix, below.

20 See W. Hutton, "Hisk Risk Strategy" The [Manchester]Guardian (30 October 1995) 2-2.
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One major advantage of Hutton's classificatory scheme over the
other two is that it gives a clear place to those who are unemployed or
otherwise economically inactive. The three broad strata, which Hutton
calls "the advantaged," "the newly insecure," and "the disadvantaged,"
comprise ten groups, which are set out in Table 3, below.
TABLE 3
THE SOCIAL GROUPS COMPRISING HUTTON'S
30/30/40 SOCIETY

1. Full-time employment for two years or more (minus those
below 50 per cent of median earnings)
2. Full-time, self-employed for two years or more
3. Part-time employment for five years or more
Total Advantaged (40 per cent)
4. Full-time employment for less than two years (plus those
below 50 per cent of median earnings)
5. Full-time, self-employed for less than two years (plus parttime self-employment)
6. Part-time employment for less than five years
7. Temporary employment
Total Newly Insecure (30 per cent)
8. Unemployed
9. Inactive
10. Training programs (plus unpaid family workers)
Total Disadvantaged (30 per cent)
IV. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
My suggestions for further research are as follows:
(1) to use any or all of the schema outlined above (and I have a
hunch that some classification based on Hutton's schema might be
particularly useful) to characterize the class composition of bankrupts;
(2) to compare this with the class composition of society and,
using data from other studies, with debtors who are subject to statutory
debt enforcement procedures; and
(3) to identify those groups that are most prone to bankruptcy
and, having done so, to carry out a multivariate analysis (using a wide
range of appropriate variables) of the changing numbers in these groups
and changing pressures on them.

134
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My answer to Ramsay's rhetorical question-"Does the
relationship between bankruptcy and social class matter?"-is, like his,
that it does matter very much, both because it enables us to understand
the phenomenon better, and because a better understanding is an
essential precondition for any rational discussion of proposals for
reform.
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